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LESSONS FROM NEW ORLEANS: A STRONGER
ROLE FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN SPURRING
INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM
ACE M. FACTOR†
ABSTRACT
Excessive caseloads prevent public defenders from fulfilling their
ethical obligations and curtail criminal defendants’ right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Despite this ethical and constitutional dilemma,
legislators have been reluctant to provide adequate funds for indigent
defense. And because of the separation of powers, courts have been
unable to force legislators’ hands. Against this backdrop, criminal
defendants in states that choose not to adequately fund indigent defense
face a serious risk of wrongful conviction.
The Orleans Public Defenders Office (OPD) provides a case study
of public defenders playing a stronger role in spurring legislative
reform. In response to a funding crisis in Louisiana, the OPD refused
to take new cases beyond constitutionally permissible workloads. This
refusal resulted in criminal defendants being put on waiting lists for
representation, which garnered national attention, gave rise to class
action lawsuits against the state, and created a threat to public safety.
These are governance problems that legislators prioritize over funding
indigent defense. The OPD’s refusal to take new cases has been
somewhat successful: in response to this crisis, the state legislature has
provided additional funds to public defenders’ offices in the state.
Public defenders are in a unique position to put pressure on
legislators. By refusing to take new cases that would cause their
workloads to be excessive, public defenders can both maintain their
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obligations to the profession and ensure constitutional representation
for their clients.

INTRODUCTION
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel,1 and criminal defense lawyers have an ethical
obligation to provide competent representation.2 But these two
fundamental principles come into conflict when public defenders’
excessive caseloads make competent representation impossible.3
In public defenders’ offices with particularly heavy caseloads, a
public defender may have only a few hours to devote to each client.4
The public defenders in New Orleans work long hours investigating
and trying cases and visiting their clients in jail. But they have a
“pervading sense that they can never do enough.”5 One New Orleans
public defender, Lauren Anderson, has had to tell defendants, “Not
only can I not help, but nobody from my office can help you, either.”6
Public defenders like Anderson, while “juggling 300 or more cases at
once,” are often not able to adequately investigate their cases or visit
their clients, who, if arrested in Orleans Parish, are sometimes jailed
more than 250 miles away.7 While defendants wait for representation,

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 339–40 (1962).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires . . . preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
3. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14 (2009) (“[C]rushing
workloads make it impossible for many defenders to effectively represent clients. Too often,
counsel is unable to spend sufficient time on each of their cases. This forces even the most
competent and dedicated attorneys to run afoul of their professional duties.”); Tina Peng, I’m a
Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a Good Job Representing My Clients, WASH.
POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isntjust-broken—its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/C7UL-3SHU] (“The American Bar Association recommends that public
defenders not work on more than 150 felony cases a year. In 2014, I handled double that.”).
4. See, e.g., Peng, supra note 3 (describing the work conditions at the Orleans Public
Defenders Office (OPD)).
5. Jed Lipinski, The Trials and Travails of a New Orleans Public Defender, NOLA.COM
(Mar. 30, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/03/new_orleans_public_
defender_trials_and_travails.html [https://perma.cc/E873-LMZF].
6. Id.
7. Id.
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stories can change and important evidence can disappear.8 And
without lawyers to investigate these leads, defendants face a serious
risk of wrongful conviction.
Excessive caseloads and severe underfunding of public defenders’
offices systematically deprive criminal defendants of their right to
effective counsel. These are well-documented problems,9 and the need
for reform is not new.10 The harder question is how that reform should
happen.
One route is reform through the political process. State
legislatures allocate funds to public defenders’ offices, and in a perfect
world, the head of a given public defenders’ office could simply explain
the conundrum to the legislature and urge it to allocate more funds to
public defense.11 In practice, though, representation for criminal
8. For a description of a case that was taken by a private attorney in New Orleans who was
able to uncover exculpatory evidence in Houston, Texas, evidence which the OPD would not
have been able to retrieve due to its excessive caseloads, see Scott Greenfield, Cross: Derwyn
Bunton, Fighting for the Poor of New Orleans, MIMESIS LAW (Aug. 3, 2016), http://mimesislaw.
com/fault-lines/cross-derwyn-bunton-fighting-for-the-poor-of-new-orleans/11837 [https://perma.
cc/L6G8-5FBB] (“I realized my office could not guarantee the timely retrieval of this important
evidence before it was erased or otherwise destroyed. This would have left an innocent man to
face trial for his life for what was labeled an act of ‘domestic terror’ by the mayor of New
Orleans.”).
9. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID &
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC
DEFENSE 12 (2011) (“There is abundant evidence that those who furnish public defense services
across the country have far too many cases, and this reality impacts the quality of their
representation, often severely eroding the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right
to counsel.”); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009), http://
www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/J75P-VJZB]
[hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (“[T]he country’s current fiscal crisis . . . ha[s] severe adverse
consequences for the funding of indigent defense services, which already receives substantially
less financial support compared to prosecution and law enforcement. Undoubtedly, the most
visible sign of inadequate funding is attorneys attempting to provide defense services while
carrying astonishingly large caseloads.”); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel
in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (“By every measure in
every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is
drastically underfinanced.”); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role
in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 826 (2009) (“Systematic underfunding of criminal
defense representation in the state courts persists, resulting in repeated and widespread
breakdowns in defense representation in many states.” (footnote omitted)).
10. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 50 (“Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Gideon decision
in 1963, several organizations have conducted national studies of indigent defense over several
decades. Invariably, these studies conveyed a grim view of defense services in criminal and
juvenile cases, pointing out many problems in providing counsel across the country.”).
11. Greenfield, supra note 8 (“[T]he best and longest-lasting change comes at the legislative
level. So ultimately the best solution is the one where OPD and other system stakeholders and
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defendants is not a top priority for legislatures.12 State governments
commonly spend three times as much on prosecutions as on public
defense, and “no state has ever enacted a statute that requires
automatic increases in the size of defender programs when
prosecutions increase.”13
In some instances, courts have exercised their “inherent
authority” and “supervisory jurisdiction” to remedy systemic
constitutional violations of the right to counsel. Although the
separation of powers has limited courts from ordering additional funds,
these types of judicial interventions have had some success in changing
legislative priorities.14
Another potential solution is class action litigation. It has had
some success in spurring legislatures to fund public defense.15 Lawsuits
provide indigent defendants a route to vindicate their Sixth
Amendment rights on a class-wide basis when states fail to provide
adequate representation. In New York, for example, indigent criminal
defendants brought a class action lawsuit, and the parties reached a
significant settlement with the state that required structural reform,
which included additional funding for indigent defense.16
decision makers reform our user-pay criminal justice system in Louisiana.”). Indeed, the National
Right to Counsel Committee provided a number of recommendations to ensure that states
comply with the Constitution. Its first recommendation was that “legislators should appropriate
adequate funds so that quality indigent defense services can be provided.” JUSTICE DENIED,
supra note 9, at 11, 183.
12. See Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent Defense: The Continuing Crisis of
Excessive Caseloads, 33 CHAMPION 22, 22 (2009) (“In the face of severe government revenue
shortfalls, indigent defense has been a favorite target for cost savings at the expense of the
constitutional rights of the poor in our courtrooms.”); Julia O’Donoghue, Inadequate
Representation: No More Money Expected for Public Defenders, NOLA.COM (Apr. 18, 2016, 4:06
PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/public_defender_funding.html#incart_most
_shared-crime [https://perma.cc/DZK7-ZRRX] (“While hundreds of poor people wait in jail to
be appointed a lawyer, a judge . . . threatens to release defendants and suits are filed challenging
the constitutionality of Louisiana’s criminal justice system, lawmakers say they have no plans to
increase funding for an office designed to protect basic legal rights.”).
13. LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 23.
14. For further discussion of indigent defense reform through the judiciary, see infra Part
III.A. But see Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733 (2005) (“[T]hese decisions have been unable to
facilitate long-term, sustainable reform of the indigent defense system.”).
15. See generally Margaret A. Costello, Fulfilling the Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon:
Litigation as a Viable Strategic Tool, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1951, 1962–68 (2014) (providing examples
of class action lawsuits that were successful at “raising public awareness and precipitating
legislative reform”).
16. Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 5–9, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Hurrell-Harring%20Final%20Settlement%
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The Orleans Public Defenders Office (OPD) provides a troubling
case study of these different routes to reform. The excessive caseloads
at the OPD pose an ethical dilemma for public defenders, impinge on
indigent criminal defendants’ right to counsel, and have created a
threat to public safety. Public defenders in New Orleans have resorted
to putting clients on a waiting list for representation.17 A court has
ordered the release of several criminal defendants charged with serious
felonies because the state had denied them representation.18 And the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Southern Poverty
Law Center have filed class action lawsuits on behalf of the
unrepresented indigent criminal defendants, alleging that the
defendants have been deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal
protection.19
Although the perfect solution to these problems remains unclear,
the OPD’s refusal to accept new cases represents one starting point.
And this response may have been effective—the Louisiana legislature
recently increased funding for public defenders’ offices.20
This Note argues for a stronger institutional role for public
defenders in spurring legislative reform. When criminal defendants go
unrepresented, the appropriate remedy is release. This creates a public
safety problem, which ranks higher than funding for indigent defense
on most legislators’ lists of priorities. By refusing cases to maintain
manageable caseloads, public defenders can both fulfill their ethical
20102114.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NEQ-8YSJ]; see also Victoria Bekiempis, How New York Is
Finally Helping Poor Defendants, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://www.
newsweek.com/new-york-tktk-landmark-public-defense-case-278889 [https://perma.cc/4FLZ-ZL
8W] (describing the Hurrell-Harring litigation and the benefits of the settlement with the state);
Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Defense in
New York State (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nyclu.org/news/settlement-begins-historicreformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/ZS7R-P5RR] (describing how
the Hurrell-Harring settlement agreement implemented new funding and other measures for
public defense).
17. For further discussion of the OPD’s response to budget shortages, see infra notes 166–
75 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Due to Lack of Counsel, New Orleans Judge Freezes Cases
Against 7 Inmates and Orders Their Release, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 8, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/due_to_lack_of_counsel_new_orleans_judge_freezes_cases_against
_7_inmates [https://perma.cc/U89F-6V4Z] (describing a New Orleans judge’s order releasing
inmates “charged with serious felonies—including rape and second-degree murder—because
they have been held for months without access to counsel”).
19. For further discussion of the class action lawsuits, see infra Part IV.C.3.
20. For further discussion of the Louisiana legislature’s response to the state’s indigent
defense crisis, see infra notes 213–17 and accompanying text.
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obligations and play a political role in putting pressure on legislatures
to adequately fund indigent defense.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part II details the ethical rules
implicated by excessive caseloads. Part III analyzes two possible routes
to reform: reform through the courts and reform through class action
lawsuits. Part IV is a case study of the New Orleans public defenders’
office. It reveals a gap between the constitutional rights of the indigent
accused and the practical realities facing underfunded public
defenders’ offices. It uses the OPD as a model for a stronger role for
public defenders in orienting legislative priorities toward funding
indigent defense.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”21 In Gideon v. Wainwright,22 the
Supreme Court observed that “in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth.”23 The Court pronounced that
lawyers “are necessities, not luxuries,” and held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right that applies to the
states.24
The scope of the right to counsel has expanded over the years.25
Nine years after Gideon, the Court extended the obligation to provide
attorneys to those charged with misdemeanors for which imprisonment
is a real possibility.26 In subsequent years, the Court has held that “the
right to counsel [means] the right to effective assistance of counsel,”27
and that “[a]n accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the

21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a fascinating and in-depth account of
Gideon, see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964).
23. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
24. Id.
25. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 22–27 (providing an account of the expansion of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
26. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972).
27. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986).
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trial is fair.”28 The Court has further expanded the right to counsel to
apply “once adversary proceedings have commenced,”29 at a
defendant’s initial court appearance,30 to representation during a first
appeal of a conviction,31 and to appeals of guilty pleas.32
Most recently, in Missouri v. Frye33 and Lafler v. Cooper,34 the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective
assistance of counsel before trial at all “critical stages,” including plea
bargaining.35 The Court’s holdings in Frye and Lafler are implicated in
the public defender context because a public defender who has not had
time to meet with her client cannot adequately advise the client about
a plea bargain.36
In theory, Gideon and the subsequent expansion of the right to
counsel provide substantial structural protections for indigent
defendants.37 Yet although the right to counsel has expanded, there has
been near unanimous agreement that the “promise” of Gideon has
been denied to many criminal defendants.38 In a report titled Securing
Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in Public Defense, the
American Bar Association (ABA) details the results of several studies,
28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
29. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).
30. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
31. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
32. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005).
33. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
34. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
35. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials. . . . As explained in Frye, the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot
be defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing
convictions and determining sentences.”); Frye, 566 U.S. at 143 (“[P]lea bargains have become so
central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages.”).
36. For an argument that Lafler and Frye have a limited impact on plea bargaining because
of poorly structured indigent defense services, see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561,
576–82 (2014).
37. In Gideon, the Court explained that an indigent criminal defendant “requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,” because, “[w]ithout it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
38. David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the
Reality, 32 L. & INEQUALITY 371, 372 (2014) (“[T]here is near unanimous agreement that the
‘promise’ of Gideon has been systematically denied to large numbers of criminal defendants.”).
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concluding that “those who furnish public defense services across the
country have far too many cases,” which “severely erod[es] the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel.”39 Former Attorney
General Eric Holder summed up the empty promise of Gideon in an
address to the National Summit on Indigent Defense in 2012:
Ever since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright – handed down fifty years ago next March – it has been
settled law that the Constitution requires defendants in criminal cases
to be provided with legal counsel, even if they cannot afford an
attorney. Yet, as we come together this afternoon – in jurisdictions
here in Louisiana and across the country – the basic rights guaranteed
under Gideon have yet to be fully realized. Millions of Americans still
struggle to access the legal services that they need and deserve – and
to which they are constitutionally entitled. And far too many public
defender systems lack the basic tools they need to function properly.40

In a comprehensive study on indigent defense forty years after
Gideon, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants concluded “that inadequate compensation for indigent
defense attorneys is a national problem, which makes the recruitment
and retention of experienced attorneys extraordinarily difficult.”41 The
ABA committee described the indigent defense system as one that
“lacks fundamental fairness” and “places poor persons at constant risk
of wrongful conviction.”42
Much ink has been spilled about the causes of the failure to fulfill
Gideon’s promise. Some scholars blame the structure of Gideon for its
“unfunded mandate” on the states.43 Others suggest that institutions—
39. LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 12; see also id. at 12–19 (detailing results of previous studies).
40. Eric Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Speech to the American Bar Association’s National
Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generaleric-holder-speaks-american-bar-association-s-national-summit-indigent [https://perma.cc/Q32V
-NCTY] (italics added).
41. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 9 (2004).
42. Id. at 38; see also Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan:
Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2606 (2013) (“Everyone knows
that excessive caseloads, poor funding, and a lack of training plague indigent defense delivery
systems throughout the states.”).
43. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2680 (2013)
(“The Court imposed an unfunded mandate on state governments without any enforcement
mechanism . . . .”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-569, INDIGENT
DEFENSE: DOJ COULD INCREASE AWARENESS OF ELIGIBLE FUNDING AND BETTER
DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH FUNDS HELP SUPPORT THIS PURPOSE 17 (2012) (“[T]wothirds or more of the survey respondents who were recipients of the DOJ formula grants for which
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namely, legislatures and the courts—are to blame for choosing not to
adequately fund indigent defense and refusing to take activist measures
to implement Gideon’s promise.44 But all can agree that underfunded
indigent defense systems and overworked public defenders have
limited the effectiveness and the practical reach of Gideon and its
progeny.45
II. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
A. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Relating to Excessive
Caseloads
Excessive caseloads for public defenders implicate several of the
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).
Although the Model Rules are not binding on the states, and there are
some minor variations among the state rules,46 all of the state rules of
professional conduct require “competent” representation and define
competence according to the Model Rules’ definition.47
The Model Rules regarding competence and diligence directly
target the quality of legal services. The Model Rules require lawyers to
provide competent representation, to exercise diligence, and to
communicate with clients about their cases. The Supreme Court has
said that the core of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the
“opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney to have him
indigent defense was not a required use or Tribal Courts TPA distributions reported that they did
not allocate funding for indigent defense, partly because of other competing priorities, such as
law enforcement needs.”).
44. See Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694,
2701 (2013) (advocating for “mov[ing] the political actors who control the power of the purse . . .
and the shape of the substantive criminal law to allocate the resources and make the institutional
changes that are necessary to fix what in many jurisdictions is a failing system of indigent
defense”).
45. See, e.g., KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR
PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 251 (2013) (“Almost everyone in all parts of the criminal justice system across
the United States acknowledges deep flaws in the way representation is provided to poor
people.”); Mark Walsh, Living Up to the Gideon Ideal, 99 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (2013) (noting that
although the decision was “being celebrated on its 50th anniversary, one report after another over
the years has documented the nation’s failure to truly live up to the ideal of Gideon”).
46. MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, RICHARD C. WYDICK, REX R. PERSCHBACHER & DEBRA
LYN BASSETT, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 40 (6th ed. 2003) (“Each state has a set of ethics
[rules] that govern[s] the lawyers in the state. In addition, some states have special statutes that
govern the conduct of lawyers . . . .”); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 35 n.81 (“The three states
in which the ethical rules are most dissimilar in format from the ABA Model Rules are California,
Maine, and New York.”).
47. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 35–36.
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investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.”48 So the Model
Rules relating to the “core” of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel
are especially important.
Lawyers are required to take time to thoroughly prepare for each
case. Rule 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.”49 The next sentence of the rule describes
“competent representation” as requiring “the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”50
The Model Rules also require lawyers to control their caseloads.
A lawyer must “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”51 And “[a] lawyer’s work load must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”52
Although the Rules do not prescribe a formula for determining
whether a workload is excessive, the number of cases, case complexity,
“the availability of support services, the lawyer’s experience and
ability, and the lawyer’s nonrepresentational duties” are factors that a
lawyer should consider when deciding whether to take on a new case.53
A lawyer must consider the impact that taking on a new
representation may have on a current client.54 A lawyer “shall not
represent a client” if representation “will result in violation of the rules

48. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2008) (“The core of this right has historically been,
and remains today, the ‘opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney and to have him
investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.’” (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344,
348 (1990))).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
50. Id.
51. Id. r. 1.3.
52. Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 2.
53. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 4 (2006)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 06-441]. An American Bar Association (ABA) report on the public
defense delivery system states:
Counsel’s workload, including appointed and other work, should never be so large as
to interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to the breach of ethical
obligations, and counsel is obligated to decline appointments above such levels.
National caseload standards should in no event be exceeded, but the concept of
workload (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as case complexity, support services,
and an attorney’s nonrepresentational duties) is a more accurate measurement.
AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002)
[hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES].
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see id. r. 1.16(a)(1)
(stating that a lawyer “shall not represent a client” if “the representation will result in violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law”).
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of professional conduct or other law.”55 And lawyers may not “avoid
appointment” to represent indigent defendants except for “good
cause.”56 Comment 2 to Rule 1.3 specifically states that a lawyer’s
ability to “handle the matter competently” is considered good cause.57
Excessive caseloads can also create conflicts of interest.58 The
ABA has recognized this type of conflict in situations where excessive
caseloads force a lawyer “to choose among the interests of various
clients, depriving at least some, if not all clients, of competent and
diligent defense services.”59 Every additional case an overburdened
public defender takes on creates a significant risk that the lawyer will
not have the time to provide competent representation. This materially
limits the public defender’s responsibilities to other clients.
Supervisory lawyers have a duty to ensure that subordinate
lawyers provide competent and diligent representation. A lawyer with
managerial authority “shall make reasonable efforts” to ensure that all
lawyers conform to the Model Rules.60 And subordinate lawyers (in the
public defender context, line-level public defenders) cannot escape
their duties just because they were assigned excessive caseloads by
their superiors. Subordinate lawyers are bound by the Model Rules
“notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another
person.”61 Excessive caseloads pose problems both for supervisory
lawyers who continue to accept cases in excess of a manageable
workload, and for subordinate lawyers who are unable to manage their
caseloads.
Constitutional protections have been buttressed by the Model
Rules. But for lawyers with unwieldy caseloads, adherence to the rules
of professional conduct may be impossible. Excessive caseloads limit a
lawyer’s ability to investigate her clients’ innocence or any mitigating
circumstances. And the failure to provide competent representation

55. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1). Under Rule 1.16, an exception allows a court to order a lawyer to
continue representation “notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.” Id. r.
1.16(c).
56. Id. r. 6.2(a).
57. Id. r. 6.2(a) cmt. 2.
58. For an example of heavy workloads forcing attorneys to choose between clients, see
supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
59. AM. BAR ASS’N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE
WORKLOADS 5 (2009) [hereinafter EIGHT GUIDELINES].
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
61. Id. r. 5.2.
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can render counsel “constructively absent” at critical stages of a
proceeding.62
B. The ABA’s Response to Public Defenders’ Excessive Caseloads
The ABA addressed excessive caseloads by promulgating a set of
principles and standards.63 One principle states that “[d]efense
counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation”; another demands “parity between defense counsel
and the prosecution with respect to resources” and that defense
counsel be “included as an equal partner in the judicial system.”64
More recently, prompted by the “endemic problem of excessive
caseloads for state public defenders,”65 the ABA responded by issuing
a formal ethics opinion.66 The ABA opinion is consistent with previous
state bar ethics opinions that instruct public defenders not to take on

62. For an argument that excessive caseloads render counsel “constructively absent,” see
LAURENCE A. BRENNER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y L. & POLICY, WHEN EXCESSIVE PUBLIC
DEFENDER WORKLOADS VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT A
SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 2 (2011).
63. In 1992, it published its third edition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:
Providing Defense Services. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (3d ed. 1992). These standards “cover all of the important
elements related to the structure of public defense programs, such as securing the independence
of the defense function, assigned counsel programs, contract defense services, public defender
programs, eligibility for defense services, and waiver of counsel.” JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9,
at 32.
Hoping to condense the standards, in 2002, the ABA published Ten Principles of a Public
Defense Delivery System. See generally TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 53 (condensing the standards
published in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services). The Ten
Principles are as follows: (1) “The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and
payment of defense counsel, is independent.” (2) “Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the
public defense delivery system consists of both a defender office and the active participation of
the private bar.” (3) “Clients are screened for eligibility and defense counsel is assigned and
notified of appointment, as soon as feasible after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for counsel.”
(4) “Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which to meet
with the client.” (5) “Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation.” (6) “Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of
the case.” (7) “The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case.”
(8) “There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources and
defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the judicial system.” (9) “Defense counsel is
provided with and required to attend continuing legal education.” (10) “Defense counsel is
supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and
locally adopted standards.” Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 219
(2011).
66. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53.
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more cases than they can handle competently67 and to decline
additional cases when excessive caseloads interfere with their ability to
provide competent representation.68
In the opinion, the ABA defines excessive caseloads and discusses
what lawyers should do when faced with them:
If a lawyer believes that her workload is such that she is unable to
meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in the
representation of a client, she must not continue to represent that
client, or, if representation has not yet begun, she must decline the
representation.
A lawyer’s primary ethical duty is owed to existing clients.
Therefore, a lawyer must decline to accept new cases, rather than
withdraw from existing cases, if the acceptance of a new case will
result in her workload becoming excessive. When an existing
workload does become excessive, the lawyer must reduce it to the
extent that what remains to be done can be handled in full compliance
with the Rules.69

Note that the test for whether a lawyer’s caseload is excessive is a
subjective one. It requires lawyers to take action to reduce their
caseloads, and, if caseloads remain excessive, “move to withdraw as
counsel in existing cases to the extent necessary to bring the workload
down to a manageable level.”70
The opinion also explains supervisors’ responsibility to ensure that
caseloads are manageable. It requires supervisors to monitor the
workloads of subordinate lawyers to ensure that workloads are
appropriate.71
In 2009, the ABA expanded on its ethics opinion by adopting
Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads,

67. See, e.g., Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 01-06 (2001)
(suggesting that public defenders should not take on too many cases at once because that may
result in incompetent representation); Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1798 (2004)
(acknowledging the ethical problems related to excessive caseloads for public defenders).
68. Joy, supra note 65, at 218–19; see, e.g., S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-12 (2004)
(“A public defender may not undertake or maintain a caseload that results in the attorney
violating [the] ethical obligation[] of competence . . . .”).
69. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53, at 4–5 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 8 (“If a supervisor knows that a subordinate’s workload renders the lawyer unable
to provide competent and diligent representation and the supervisor fails to take reasonable
remedial action . . . the supervisor himself is responsible for the subordinate’s violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
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which operates as a “detailed action plan . . . to which those providing
public defense should adhere as they seek to comply with their
professional responsibilities.”72
Relevant here, Guideline 6 urges public defenders to withdraw
from current cases when workloads are excessive and to file motions
asking courts to stop assigning new cases when necessary.73 The
Comment to Guideline 6 outlines a “mandatory duty” for lawyers to
take “corrective action” to avoid violations of the Model Rules.74
“When [public defenders] file motions requesting that assignments be
stopped and that withdrawals be permitted, their prayer for relief
should be accorded substantial deference because [they] are in the best
position to assess the workloads of their lawyers.”75
If a motion to withdraw or to have a court stop assigning new cases
is denied, Guideline 7 instructs public defenders to “resist judicial
directions” that “improperly interfere” with their ethical obligations to
provide competent representation.76 In passing Guideline 7, the ABA
was concerned with the independence of public defenders’ offices and
the potential for courts to “micro-manage the operations of defense
programs.”77 Although a court may sanction a lawyer for refusing to
represent a client based on a belief that competent representation is
not possible, the Guidelines recommend that refusal is nonetheless the
proper action.78 This seems to suggest that public defenders should
ignore court orders. This guideline runs counter to the ABA’s formal
72. EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 1. The Introduction to the Guidelines provides a
summary of its recommendations:
Guideline 1 urges the management of public defense programs to assess whether
excessive workloads are preventing their lawyers from fulfilling performance
obligations; and Guidelines 2, 3, and 4 relate to the need for continuous supervision
and monitoring of workloads, training of lawyers respecting their ethical duty when
confronted with excessive workloads, and the need for management to determine if
excessive workloads exist. Guidelines 5 through 8 address the range of options that
public defense providers and their lawyers should consider when excessive workloads
are present. As set forth in Guideline 6, depending on the circumstances, it may be
necessary for those providing public defense to seek redress in the courts, but other
choices may be available, as suggested in Guideline 5, before this step is required.
Id.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 12.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 13 (citing In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw, 636 So. 2d 18, 21–
22 (Fla. 1994)).
78. See id. (“When motions to stop the assignment of new cases and to withdraw from cases
are filed, [public defenders] resist judicial directions . . . that improperly interfere with their
professional and ethical duties in representing their clients.”).
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opinion that says, “If the public defender is not allowed to withdraw
from representation, she must obey the court’s order while taking all
steps reasonably feasible to insure that her client receives competent
and diligent representation.”79 This conflicting guidance poses yet
another ethical dilemma for public defenders.
III. POSSIBLE ROUTES TO REFORM
Indigent defense reform is badly needed. The most direct route to
reform is for state legislatures to provide adequate funding, or for
Congress to provide additional financial support to the states. But a
shift in legislative priorities is unlikely.80 In 1979, the ABA endorsed
the creation of an independent, federally funded program to help state
and local governments discharge their obligation to provide counsel for
indigent defendants.81 Yet since then, “there is no sign that the federal
government will help or that state and local governments are ensuring
adequate funding willingly.”82
A. Reform Through the Judiciary
Only a few courts have addressed the constitutional and ethical
issues associated with excessive caseloads on a system-wide basis.
Courts have taken at least three different approaches: (1)
implementing a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of
counsel and issuing a warning to the legislature, (2) adopting a
cooperative approach, and (3) following the ABA’s recommendations
by allowing public defenders to withdraw from cases.83
1. Rebuttable Presumptions and Warnings to the Legislature. New
Orleans public defenders have struggled with overwhelming caseloads
since at least 1993. In State v. Peart,84 Leonard Peart was charged with
serious felonies, including aggravated rape and attempted first-degree

79. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53, at 6.
80. For further discussion, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
81. Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 841 (2004).
82. Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 518, 531 (2015).
83. For further discussion of these three approaches, additional analysis of some of these
decisions, and a comparison with the federal system, see Jessica Trieu, The Federal Budget Crisis
and Its Unintended Ethical Consequences: How Will Judges, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders
Meet Their Ethical Obligations?, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 917, 925–31 (2014).
84. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
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murder.85 Peart’s court-appointed lawyer had represented 418
defendants in a seven-month period.86 Due to these constraints, the
public defender filed a “Motion for Relief to Provide Constitutionally
Mandated Protection and Resources.”87 At a hearing on the motion,
the trial court found that Peart’s attorney was not able to provide
clients with effective assistance of counsel, primarily because of his
excessive caseload.88 The court ruled that the state’s indigent defense
funding system was unconstitutional as applied in New Orleans.89 It
ordered that the attorney’s caseload be reduced and directed the
Louisiana legislature to provide additional funds “to pay additional
attorneys, secretaries, paralegals, law clerks, investigators, and expert
witnesses.”90
This sweeping order did not survive on appeal. The Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the funding statute was constitutional and,
citing separation-of-powers concerns, reversed the lower court’s order
to the legislature to fund indigent defense programs.91 Despite its ruling
in favor of the state, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the
indigent defense system “faced a crisis” and implemented a rebuttable
presumption that indigent defendants represented by New Orleans
public defenders were receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.92 The
rebuttable presumption placed the burden on the state to prove that
defense counsel was effective before the trial judge could permit a case
awaiting trial to proceed.93
In addition to implementing the seemingly strong medicine of a
rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Louisiana Supreme Court warned the legislature:
If legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform
does not take place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional and
inherent power and supervisory jurisdiction, may find it necessary to
employ more intrusive and specific measures it has thus far avoided

85. Id. at 784.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 785.
91. Id. at 791 (“We decline at this time to undertake these more intrusive and specific
measures because this Court should not lightly tread in the affairs of other branches of
government and because the legislature ought to assess such measures in the first instance.”).
92. Id. at 790–91.
93. Joy, supra note 65, at 218.
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to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably effective
assistance of counsel.94

After Peart, in 1994, the Louisiana legislature “increased funding
for public defenders by $5 million and created a task force to study the
situation in order to remove the rebuttable presumption.”95 This
funding “did not keep up with inflation keep up with inflation or
increasing caseloads” in subsequent years.96
In 2005, twelve years after Peart, the Louisiana Supreme Court
heard State v. Citizen.97 There, the trial court had appointed counsel to
represent Adrian Citizen, who was charged with first-degree murder.98
The parish was unable to provide Citizen an attorney, and the trial
court ordered the parish to set aside $200,000 for indigent defense.99
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited and repeated its earlier
warning in Peart, pointing out “the obvious deficiencies in funding
from the State to satisfy its constitutional mandate.”100 The court urged
the legislature to create a state task force to “work diligently to
formulate specific recommendations.”101 And the court nudged the
legislature to produce a plan to address the funding and caseload issues
by a specific date.102
Despite this additional warning, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the lower court’s order, again citing separation-of-powers
concerns.103 It held that if a trial judge determines that adequate
funding is not available, the judge may prohibit the state from going
forward with a prosecution until the judge determines that appropriate
funding is likely to be available.104

94. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 791.
95. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 120 n.79. For an in-depth description of the changes in
indigent defense policy in Louisiana after Peart and State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325 (La. 2005), see
Richard Drew, Louisiana’s New Public Defender System: Origins, Main Features, and Prospects
for Success, 69 LA. L. REV. 955, 961–76 (2009).
96. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 85, 104 (2007) (citing Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42
LA. B.J. 454, 457–58 (1995)); see also Drew, supra note 95, at 961–76 (collecting sources and
detailing the history of Louisiana public defense funding after Peart).
97. State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, (La. 2005).
98. Id. at 327.
99. Id. at 329.
100. Id. at 336.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 338–39.
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Now, twelve years later, criminal defendants in Louisiana
continue to await trial without representation. A criminal district court
in New Orleans recently ordered the release of seven unrepresented
criminal defendants charged with felonies because they had been
denied the right to counsel.105
2. Cooperative Approach. In State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender
Commission v. Pratte,106 the Supreme Court of Missouri considered the
case of a public defenders’ office facing inadequate resources. The
approach taken there is an example of the courts, prosecutors, and
public defenders working together to address excessive caseloads.107
Before the Missouri high court weighed in on the issue, the
Missouri Senate issued a report about public defense in the state. The
report found that “the probability that public defenders are failing to
provide effective assistance of counsel and are violating their ethical
obligations to their clients increases every day.”108 In response to the
report, the Missouri Public Defender Commission enacted a regulation
that limited the number of cases each public defender district and
individual lawyer could take, set a yearly hour maximum for each
lawyer, and required that a district be placed on “limited availability”
status if the number of hours needed to handle its caseload was greater
than the number of available attorney hours.109 In 2009, two years after
the implementation of this rule, every Missouri public defenders’ office
was over its calculated capacity.110
Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the
proper remedy for an excessive caseload under the regulation is for the
public defender to “certify the office as having ‘limited availability’
once its maximum caseload is exceeded for three consecutive
months.”111 Once the certification occurs, the public defender notifies
the presiding judge and prosecutors of the impending unavailability of

105. See State v. Bernard, No. 528-021, slip op. at 11 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish Apr.
8, 2016) (granting the release of the defendants without dismissing their charges).
106. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009).
107. For further discussion of Missouri’s cooperative approach, see Peter A. Joy, Ensuring
the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of Excessive Caseloads, 75 MO. L. REV. 771, 788–
89 (2010).
108. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 877–78.
109. See id. at 878–79 (describing limited availability status as occurring when a public
defenders’ office exceeds its maximum caseload for three consecutive months).
110. Id. at 880.
111. Id.
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services.112 The public defender, prosecutor, and presiding judge then
confer to agree on measures to reduce demand for public defender
services, including
the prosecutors’ agreement to limit the cases in which the state seeks
incarceration; determining cases or categories of cases in which
private attorneys are to be appointed; a determination by the judges
not to appoint any counsel in certain cases (which would result in the
cases not being available for trial or disposition); or in the absence of
agreement by prosecutors and judge to any resolution, the rule
authorizes the public defender to make the office unavailable for any
appointments until the caseload falls below the commission’s
standard.113

This approach allows public defenders, judges, and prosecutors to
solve the problems of excessive caseloads in a cooperative manner. By
allowing for cooperation, this approach was thought to “promise[]
some degree of relief,” while still recognizing that the public defender
system must be able to limit case intake.114
Although this cooperative approach sounds like an ideal solution,
it has not proven effective in practice. In 2010, all attempts to reach
agreements with prosecutors and judges were unsuccessful.115 The
Missouri Supreme Court appointed a special master to investigate the
matter, who concluded that the procedure prescribed in Pratte would
simply not resolve Missouri’s increasing caseloads and limited
resources.116
3. The ABA Approach. In Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial
Circuit v. State,117 the most recent state high court case addressing the
issue of excessive caseloads, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
public defenders’ office could withdraw from a case “based on
excessive caseload or underfunding that would result in ineffective
representation of indigent defendants.”118 Because the Florida
Supreme Court’s approach allows courts to grant withdrawal motions

112. Id. at 887.
113. Id. (footnotes omitted).
114. Joy, supra note 107, at 789.
115. Professor Peter Joy provides an extensive discussion of the results of and problems with
Missouri’s approach in Joy, supra note 65, at 220–25.
116. Id. at 221.
117. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013).
118. Id. at 282.
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from public defenders with excessive caseloads, it is consistent with the
ABA’s formal opinion.119
There, the public defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed
motions seeking to be relieved of the obligation to represent twentyone defendants in noncapital felony cases, claiming that excessive
caseloads caused by underfunding prevented the office from meeting
its obligation to the defendants.120 The lower court certified the
question of whether a Florida statute, which prohibited a trial court
from granting a motion for withdrawal by a public defender because of
a conflict caused by underfunding or an excessive caseload, was an
unconstitutional violation of an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.121
The Florida Supreme Court described the conditions at the Dade
County Public Defender’s office in stark terms. The office engaged in
a routine practice of “meet and greet” pleas—public defenders
“serve[d] as mere conduits for plea offers.”122 The lawyers lacked
adequate time to investigate cases.123 And the office “triage[d]” its
cases by giving priority to the cases of defendants in custody.124
Although the Florida Supreme Court held that the funding statute
was constitutional on its face, it also held that a statute prohibiting any
withdrawal would infringe on the court’s “inherent authority” to
ensure adequate representation of indigent defendants.125 Because of
the limited amount of time public defenders had to meet with and
advise their clients about pleas, the court found that the public

119. For an argument that the Florida approach is consistent with the ABA formal ethics
opinion, see Trieu, supra note 83, at 930.
120. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 115 So. 3d at 265.
121. Id. at 264–65 (quoting FLA. STAT., § 27.5303(1)(d) (2007)).
122. Id. at 278. The Florida Supreme Court further described the situation at the Public
Defender’s office:
Witnesses from the Public Defender’s office described “meet and greet pleas” as being
routine procedure. The assistant public defender meets the defendant for the first time
at arraignment during a few minutes in the courtroom or hallway and knows nothing
about the case except for the arrest form provided by the state attorney, yet is expected
to counsel the defendant about the State’s plea offer. In this regard, the public
defenders serve “as mere conduits for plea offers.”
Id.
123. Id. (“The witnesses also testified that the attorneys almost never visited the crime scenes,
were unable to properly investigate or interview witnesses themselves . . . and were often
unprepared to proceed to trial when the case was called.”).
124. Id. (“The witnesses also described engaging in ‘triage’ with their cases—giving priority
to the cases of defendants in custody, leaving out-of-custody defendants effectively without
representation for lengthy periods subsequent to arraignment.”).
125. Id. at 282.
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defenders’ office had demonstrated cause to withdraw.126 It determined
that if the statute prohibiting trial courts from granting motions to
withdraw from “conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive
caseload or the prospective inability to adequately represent a client”
were to be interpreted “as prohibiting any motion to withdraw based
on excessive caseloads or underfunding, then [the statute] would
violate the courts’ inherent authority to ensure adequate
representation to defendants.”127 Instead, the court interpreted the
statute to not apply if it “preclude[d] a public defender from filing a
motion to withdraw based on excessive caseload or underfunding that
would result in ineffective representation of indigent defendants nor [if
it] preclude[d] a trial court from granting a motion to withdraw under
those circumstances.”128 The court announced a duty to intervene when
excessive caseloads amount to “nonrepresentation and therefore a
denial of the actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by Gideon and the
Sixth Amendment.”129 Although it provided room for courts to
intervene, the Florida Supreme Court did not describe how a court
should determine the circumstances under which a motion to withdraw
should be granted.130
B. Class Action Litigation
Class action litigation allows criminal defendants to seek remedies
for systemic violations of their right to counsel.131 One example is the
litigation in Hurrell-Harring v. State, which began in 2007 with a class
action complaint filed by the New York Civil Liberties Union on behalf
of indigent criminal defendants in New York.132 The complaint alleged

126. Id. at 279.
127. Id. at 282.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 278–79.
130. Instead, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to make the
determination. It seems likely, though, that if a public defender, consistent with ABA Formal
Opinion 06-441, “believes that her workload is such that she is unable to meet the basic ethical
obligations required of her in the representation of a client,” under the court’s reasoning in Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, the court should allow withdrawal. Formal Op. 06441, supra note 53, at 4.
131. See generally Costello, supra note 15 (advocating for class action litigation as a strategy
to remedy right-to-counsel violations and describing several examples of such litigation).
132. See Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2008) (“This civil rights lawsuit is brought to remedy the State of New York’s
persistent failure to guarantee meaningful and effective legal representation to indigent people
accused of crimes, as required by the New York State Constitution and laws and the United States
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that the defendants “face[d] a severe and unacceptably high risk of not
receiving meaningful and effective assistance of counsel.”133 The
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring the state “to provide a
system of public defense consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the State of New York and the United States Constitution.”134
The plaintiffs were successful in the trial court, and the state
appealed to the Appellate Division, where it prevailed in a 3–2 decision
holding that the complaint was not justiciable on separation-of-powers
grounds.135 The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals,
which reversed and remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the
merits.136 In a 4–3 decision, the court held that the complaint set forth
a “constructive denial of the right to counsel by reason of insufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.”137
The case gained widespread attention, and the United States
Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in support of the
plaintiffs.138 In 2011, a three-judge panel of the Appellate Division,
Third Department granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class

Constitution.”). For further discussion of the complicated procedural history of the HurrellHarring litigation, see LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 183–86.
133. Hurrell-Harring Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 132, at 5. The complaint
also provides extensive descriptions of the systemic failures of the New York public defense
system. See id. at 4 (detailing an extensive list of deficiencies, including restrictive client-eligibility
standards, a lack of standards for attorney supervision and monitoring, and a lack of attorney
training and resources for support staff, among other failures); see generally COMM’N ON THE
FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (2006) (detailing the findings of a commission with the responsibility to “examine the
effectiveness of indigent criminal defense services across the State, and consider the alternative
models of assigning, supervising, and financing assigned counsel compatible with New York’s
constitutional and fiscal realities”).
134. Hurrell-Harring Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 132, at 103.
135. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351, 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
136. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 228 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).
137. Id. at 225.
138. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/09/25/
hurrell_soi_9-25-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQT4-UB66]. It states:
It is the position of the United States that constructive denial of counsel may occur in
two, often linked circumstances: (1) When, on a systemic basis, lawyers for indigent
defendants operate under substantial structural limitations, such as a severe lack of
resources, unreasonably high workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender
offices; and/or (2) When the traditional markers of representation—such as timely and
confidential consultation with clients, appropriate investigation, and meaningful
adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—are absent or significantly compromised
on a system-wide basis.
Id.
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certification,139 and the day before the case was set to go to trial in 2014,
the parties reached a settlement agreement.140 In the settlement
agreement, the state agreed to assume responsibility for funding and
oversight of indigent defense in five of its sixty-two counties.141 The
settlement ensures that every poor criminal defendant will have a
lawyer at his or her first court appearance.142 It requires New York to
hire enough lawyers, investigators, and support staff to ensure that all
poor criminal defendants have lawyers with the time and support
necessary to vigorously represent their clients.143 It provides for the
setting of caseload standards that will substantially limit the number of
cases any lawyer can carry, and requires the state to spend more than
$4 million to increase attorney communications with poor criminal
defendants.144 The settlement also mandates the creation of eligibility
standards for representation, and it provides that the plaintiffs will
receive detailed reports allowing them to monitor compliance with the
agreement.145
The Hurrell-Harring settlement agreement was successful in
forcing the state to provide funding for indigent defense and to remedy
systemic Sixth Amendment violations. The main drawback to this
strategy, though, is that it takes time. The complaint in Hurrell-Harring
was filed in 2007, and a settlement was not reached until 2014. All the
while, the plaintiffs remained in jail, and indigent criminal defendants
continued to receive inadequate representation.
IV. ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS: AN OFFICE IN CRISIS
The OPD is in crisis. The office represents more than 85 percent
of the criminal defendants in New Orleans,146 and it was assigned over
20,000 cases in 2015.147 That year, the OPD handled nearly 10,000
misdemeanors, nearly 8,000 felonies, 220 cases designated Life

139. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367,372 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
140. Hurrell-Harring Stipulation and Order of Settlement, supra note 16, at 5–9; N.Y. Civil
Liberties Union, supra note 16 (describing the settlement agreement).
141. Hurrell-Harring Stipulation and Order of Settlement, supra note 16, at 5–9.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Id. at 10–11.
145. Id. at 11–12, 14–15.
146. Transcript of Court Proceedings at 45, Louisiana v. Wroten, No. 520-385 (La. Crim. Dist.
Ct., Orleans Parish Nov. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Wroten Transcript].
147. Id. at 52.
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Without Parole, and two capital cases.148 Each of the OPD’s sixty staff
attorneys is assigned to hundreds of cases at a time.
A. Unreliable Funding Structure for Indigent Defense
In New Orleans, funding for public defense is not a high priority:
in 2015, “citizens appropriated nearly $200 million dollars” for law
enforcement and the district attorney, but only $1.5 million for the
OPD.149 The budget crisis at the OPD is attributable to the funding
mechanism the state has put in place.150 Almost two-thirds of funding
for Louisiana public defenders comes from a “user pay” funding
mechanism: traffic cameras, tickets, and statutory fees.151 The statutory
fees include a $45 public defender’s fee assessed whenever a defendant
is convicted after trial, pleads guilty or no contest, or forfeits a bond.152
Because the fee is not assessed if a defendant is found not guilty, the
OPD gets “paid to lose.”153
The funding structure is necessarily unreliable because the
amount of money collected in traffic tickets each year varies
unpredictably.154 If sheriffs choose to reduce traffic enforcement,
public defender revenues drop. The OPD has “no control over these
revenue streams, their collection, or disbursement.”155 Funding can be
reduced for reasons like “severe weather, elections and other political
vagaries, judicial action, reductions in road traffic, and the lack of
148. The exact numbers are: 9,513 misdemeanors, 7,911 felonies, 8 capital cases, and 2,690
revocations. ORLEANS PUB. DEF., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (2017), http://www.opdla.org/images/
files/2015-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZQP-5AGZ].
149. Id.
150. For more background on the origins of the state funding structure and an insightful
critique of the criminal-justice system in post-Katrina New Orleans, much of which remains
relevant to the problems the OPD faces today, see Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal
Justice Collapse: The Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 145–54 (2006).
151. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., LPDB 2014 ANNUAL BOARD REPORT 1, 22 (2015) [hereinafter
LPDB ANNUAL REPORT]; John Burkhart, The Crisis in Public Defense Funding: The
Approaching Storm & What Must Be Done, 62 LA. BAR J. 360, 361 (2015); see also Wroten
Transcript, supra note 146, at 33−34 (criticizing the “user pay” system and indicating that up to
half of the OPD budget is made up of fines and fees).
152. LPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 26.
153. If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, REVEAL (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/
episodes/if-you-cant-afford-a-lawyer [https://perma.cc/59ZS-WKPC].
154. See LPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 22 (“Law enforcement can unilaterally
reduce traffic enforcement. Traffic cases can be diverted so that no proceeds reach the public
defender in the district. . . . Further, district offices are entirely reliant upon their counterparts in
the criminal justice system to collect and remit the fines . . . needed to operate their respective
offices.”).
155. Id. at 1.
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interstate or major highways in a particular jurisdiction.”156 Due to this
unreliable funding mechanism, in its 2014 Annual Report, the
Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB)157 presciently warned of an
impending “systemic failure” in the Louisiana public defense system.158
The LPDB recommended that the state “[r]estructure” its
criminal-justice funding scheme.159 The board urged the legislature to
create a task force to study more reliable measures and develop
recommendations to ensure adequate funding for the criminal-justice
system.160
B. OPD’s Response to the Budget Crisis
The unreliability of the OPD’s funding structure is evidenced by
the 2015 projections for revenue being short by more than $300,000, as
well as the state’s reduction of OPD funding by $700,000 for 2016.161
OPD attorneys’ workloads are beyond manageable levels.162 And New
Orleans maintains a trial rate well above the state and national
averages.163
Further complicating the problem, the Orleans Parish district
attorney boasts a case-acceptance rate of over 90 percent.164 Unlike the
OPD, the New Orleans district attorney “cannot let budget constraints
affect [his] ability to operate.”165
In a letter to criminal-justice stakeholders in New Orleans
providing an overview of a proposed “restriction of services plan,”
OPD Chief Defender Derwyn Bunton noted that the funding crisis
156. Id. at 22.
157. The Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB) is the state board charged with oversight
of local public defenders’ offices. The LPDB was created by the Louisiana legislature in 2007 in
response to widespread problems in the quality and consistency of legal representation for
Louisiana’s indigent residents. Id. at 1. Its mission statement states, “Through its commitment to
performance standards, ethical excellence, data-driven practices and client-centered advocacy,
the LPDB oversees the delivery of high quality legal services.” Mission and Vision, LA. PUB. DEF.
BD., http://lpdb.la.gov/About/Mission%20and%20Vision.php [https://perma.cc/8S9D-6BEQ].
158. LPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 23 (“We expect at least 25 of 42 district
offices will lack the funds to cover their expenses during the coming fiscal year, FY16 . . . .”).
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id.
161. Letter from Derwyn Bunton, Chief Dist. Def., Orleans Public Defenders, to New
Orleans Criminal Justice Stakeholders (June 18, 2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
162. ORLEANS PUB. DEF. OFF., RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4
(2015) [hereinafter RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, supra note 153.
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“compromises the OPD’s ability to provide mandated legal services,
brings higher costs in our criminal justice system, and ultimately puts
public safety at risk.”166 Bunton announced that, if the excessive
caseloads continued, the office would “place appointed clients on a
waitlist for representation” so attorneys could manage their
caseloads.167 And if the excessive caseloads continued for “an extended
length of time,” the OPD would “begin refusing new case
appointments.”168
In response to these budget shortages and excessive caseloads, in
July 2015, the OPD initiated a “restriction of services plan.”169 The plan
describes the dilemma as a “triangle” of public defense.170 This refers
to a three-way balancing of the constitutional obligation to provide
competent effective counsel, the ethical obligations of the profession,
and the obligation to comply with state professional standards.171
The plan entails a hiring freeze, office-wide furloughs and a
caseload-monitoring program. It also eliminated representation for
capital cases and began refusing to contract for new noncapital cases.172
The OPD expected that public defenders’ caseloads would rise once
the plan went into effect.173
In addition to the plan, the OPD launched a crowdfunding
campaign to help cover its costs.174 The campaign raised around $85,000
from thirty-six states and twelve countries.175
C. Implications of the Restriction of Services Plan
Once the OPD is appointed to a case, it takes weeks to assign it to
an available OPD lawyer, leaving defendants on a waiting list for

166. Letter from Derwyn Bunton, supra note 161, at 2.
167. Id.
168. RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN, supra note 162, at 4.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 4–5.
172. See Letter from Derwyn Bunton, supra note 161, at 2 (providing an overview of the
Restriction of Services Plan).
173. RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN, supra note 162, at 2.
174. In response to the crowdfunding campaign, John Oliver quipped that “nobody should be
in jail because a Kickstarter didn’t meet its goal.” Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Public
Defenders (HBO television broadcast Sept. 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
USkEzLuzmZ4 [https://perma.cc/QGL7-NAZB].
175. ORLEANS PUB. DEF., supra note 148.
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representation.176 Since the plan went into effect, funding cuts have
caused the OPD to lose seventeen felony attorneys and a total of thirtyseven staff positions.177 As of March 2017, the office has sixty total
attorneys, with fifty-one “line attorneys” who take on a full caseload
and work between sixty and sixty-five hours per week.178 The office has
only thirteen investigators to handle the entire OPD caseload.179
1. Criminal District Court Hearing on Caseloads. In response to
its excessive caseloads, the OPD requested that the New Orleans
criminal district courts stop appointing it to new cases.180 Testimony
from a district court hearing on the request demonstrates the dilemma
facing the OPD.181 At the hearing, the OPD put on testimony from the
state public defender, the chief public defender for Orleans Parish, and
legal ethics experts. The hearing testimony indicated that, under its
current caseloads, the OPD’s practices violate the Louisiana Rules of
Professional
Conduct182
regarding
competence,
diligence,
communication with clients, confidentiality of information, conflicts of
interest, declining or terminating representation, responsibilities of
176. See Ken Daley, Judge: Patience Running Out on Orleans Public Defenders’
Unavailability, NOLA.COM (Apr. 4, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/
02/judge_warns_patience_running_o.html [https://perma.cc/PAN3-57H5] (describing statements
from a New Orleans judge to the OPD chief of trials, including, “[y]our office needs to step up to
the plate and start finding attorneys for these clients,” and setting a deadline for the OPD to
appoint an attorney to a case); Richard Fausset, New Orleans Puts Poor on ‘Waiting List’ for
Lawyers, Suit Alleges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/us/neworleans-public-defender-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/7DHB-HZPG] (“The steps, which vary
from office to office, include instituting waiting lists and hiring freezes, and refusing some new
cases.”).
177. Email from Lindsey Hortenstine, Commc’ns Dir., Orleans Public Defenders, to author
(Mar. 13, 2017, 09:27 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Note that the OPD requested that the court stop appointing the OPD to new cases,
rather than announce that the office would no longer take any new cases. The OPD was also not
seeking to withdraw from its currently pending cases at the hearing; instead, it sought “a
prospective remedy,” asking that “this Court does not appoint future cases to our office.” Wroten
Transcript, supra note 146, at 7. This distinction is significant, because the OPD has the authority
to refuse to take new cases altogether, yet it chose to request judicial relief.
181. Id.
182. The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct are substantially similar to the Model
Rules. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Rule 1.1.: Competence, LA. LEGAL ETHICS, https://
lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-of-professional-conduct/article-1-client-lawyer-relationship/rule
-1-1-competence [https://perma.cc/7W6P-ELEN] (stating, in a section titled “Model Rule
Comparison,” that “[t]his rule is substantially similar to ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.1”); see generally LA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT (adopting an essentially identical
structure to that of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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managers and supervisory lawyers, and responsibilities of a
subordinate lawyer.183
These ethical violations impact the constitutional rights of nearly
all of the criminal defendants in New Orleans. Professor Ellen
Yaroshefsky, a legal ethics expert, reviewed affidavits of OPD
attorneys and testified about the problems at the OPD.184 She
explained that the office does not operate consistently with the rules185
and recommended that the OPD not take future cases.186 She observed
that OPD lawyers “have gotten to the point where there’s a systemic
violation of the rules of professional conduct.”187 OPD lawyers have to
“make a decision of triage; and triage is a conflict of interest and that’s
a systemic problem in this office.”188 From the witness stand,
Yaroshefsky described the conditions at the OPD: “You’re not
operating a justice system here. You’re operating a processing
system.”189
By juggling too many cases and engaging in “triage” to decide how
to allocate time and resources, OPD lawyers operate under continuous
concurrent conflicts of interests: each new case a public defender takes
on above a manageable caseload materially limits that lawyer’s ability
to recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for other
clients.190 With regard to competence, the lawyers do not have
sufficient time to meet with and counsel clients.191 With regard to
diligence, the lawyers lack the time and resources to adequately
investigate cases.192

183. See generally Wroten Transcript, supra note 146 (describing the problems caused by
excessive caseloads at the OPD).
184. Id. at 70.
185. Id. at 76.
186. Id. at 75.
187. Id. at 72.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 72.
190. See id. at 87–88 (“[T]he entire operation of the OPD, operates with a conflict of
interest. . . . [W]ith the number of cases that they have . . . they’re simply not able to adequately
provide competent counsel to the vast majority [of their clients].”).
191. See id. at 114 (“If you’re not even able to see your client until the day before trial,
particularly a mentally ill client, it’s nearly impossible to prepare adequately for whatever kind of
hearing you have and certainly for trial.”).
192. See id. at 77–78 (“They can’t investigate cases. They can’t serve subpoenas and so they
haven’t done what is necessary to be a diligent lawyer.”); id. at 91 (“It’s a systemic problem . . . .
It can’t be a system where the courts, among other actors, just expect lawyers are going to stand
up without doing any work essentially because they can plead guilty and put people through a
plea mill . . . .”); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT
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2. Court Order Releasing Unrepresented Defendants. After the
hearing, the court did not relieve the OPD from taking new cases. The
court did, however, offer (fleeting) relief to some unrepresented
indigent criminal defendants by ordering their release.193 These
defendants were charged with serious felonies, including seconddegree murder, first-degree rape, and armed robbery with a firearm.194
They had been incarcerated without the assistance of counsel for
between 81 and 138 days.195 The state has appealed the release order,
so, for now, the defendants remain incarcerated. But the court’s
pronouncement that “defendants’ constitutional rights are not
contingent upon budget demands, waiting lists, and the failure of the
legislature to adequately fund indigent defense” strikes at the heart of
the problem caused by the OPD’s excessive caseloads.196
In its order releasing the defendants, the court criticized the state
legislature’s failure to fund public defense. The court noted that the
public defenders’ lack of preparation and the absence of pretrial
investigation “raise[d] serious concerns” about the defendants’ access
to effective assistance of counsel.197 It found that the “defendants’
attorneys have demonstrated that they cannot effectively represent
their clients without adequate funding and resources.”198 The court
“ha[d] no difficulty concluding [that] the defendants’ constitutional
right to assistance of counsel [was] being violated.”199 Because of the
“absence of a date certain” for when sufficient funding for indigent
defense would be available, the court held that the New Orleans
indigent defense system violated the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.200

DEFENSE SERIES # 4, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 5 (2001) (“If a judge
with responsibility for appointing counsel . . . recognizes that overwhelming caseloads may
jeopardize a defendant’s right to competent representation of counsel, it is the judge’s
responsibility to identify and rectify the situation.”).
193. State v. Bernard, No. 528-021, slip op. at 11 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016).
194. Id. at 7–8.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 10.
197. Id. at 9.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 11 (“The absence of a date certain when proceedings are to begin and when
adequate funding will be made available by the legislature for constitutionally mandated
representation of defendants who cannot afford an attorney violates the Sixth Amendment
right[s] to counsel and effective assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.”).
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3. Class Action Lawsuits. In response to the restriction of services
plan, the ACLU filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of
Louisiana on behalf of New Orleans’s unrepresented indigent
defendants who had been placed on a waiting list by the OPD.201 The
plaintiffs alleged that, by placing them on a waiting list for
representation, the OPD (acting through Chief Defender Bunton) had
violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
equal protection.202
The court criticized the broken indigent defense system, but
ultimately dismissed the case on “comity and federalism grounds.”203 It
said, “It is clear that the Louisiana legislature is failing miserably at
upholding its obligations under Gideon. Budget shortages are no
excuse to violate the United States Constitution.”204 Yet it concluded
that this crisis was not able to surmount “the difficult federalism
obstacles” associated with obtaining injunctive relief from a federal
court.205 The court dismissed the case because any declaratory or
injunctive relief by the federal court “would inevitably lead . . . [the
court] to become the overseer of the Orleans Parish criminal court
system, a result explicitly condemned by the United States Supreme
Court in Younger and O’Shea.”206 As did the courts in the cases
described above,207 the court punted the problem to the legislature:
“Lasting relief will only come when the legislature locates an adequate
source of funding for public defense offices.”208
The Southern Poverty Law Center has also recently filed a class
action lawsuit against Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards in state
201. See Class Action Complaint at 14–15, Yarls v. Bunton, No. 3:16-cv-31 (M.D. La. Jan. 14,
2016), 2016 WL 212997 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ claims for relief under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
202. Id. at 14. It is worth noting that the parties’ interests were not completely adverse.
Because as the defendant, Bunton did not contend that his placing the plaintiffs on a waiting list
was constitutional, there was “no disagreement as to liability.” Yarls v. Bunton, No. 16-31-JJBRLB, 2017 WL 424874, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 31, 2017). The court noted that the “parties are
aligned in seeking a judicial declaration . . . in an apparent attempt to place pressure on the
Louisiana legislature to increase funds for public defense services.” Id. at *1 n.10. Because of this
friendly party alignment, the court “at every turn . . . had to question the nature of its own power
without the aid of the illumination that ‘concrete adverseness brings.’” Id. at *3.
203. Yarls, 2017 WL 424874, at *1.
204. Id. at *7 (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at *4.
206. Id. at *3.
207. See supra Part III.A.
208. Yarls, 2017 WL 424874, at *7.
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court.209 The plaintiffs are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging that the state has violated their rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.210
*

*

*

The OPD remains in crisis. Criminal defendants in New Orleans
are stuck on waiting lists for representation, and OPD attorneys still
have unmanageable caseloads. Recognizing this crisis, the president of
the ABA wrote a letter to Governor Edwards, urging him to
adequately fund indigent defense in the state.211 The OPD chief
defender wrote an op-ed in the New York Times describing the
challenges the OPD faces: “[P]oor defendants have been left to
represent themselves. And . . . judges have threatened public defenders
with contempt for refusing to take a case.”212
Yet counterintuitively, the actions taken by the OPD may have
worked to reorient legislative priorities. The New Orleans City Council
recently approved a new 2017 budget that funds the OPD “at or above
2016 levels in the final budget” while cutting funds for the Orleans
Parish District Attorney’s Office.213 And in response to the crisis, the
Louisiana legislature has provided more funds for the OPD. Although
the bill did not provide any net new money for public defense, it
increased the percentage of funds allocated to district public defender
offices like the OPD.214 Yet in doing so, it diverted funds away from

209. Verified Petition for Class Certification and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–4,
Allen v. Edwards, No. 655079 (La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 1056616, at *2–4.
210. Id.
211. See Letter from Paulette Brown, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to John Bel
Edwards, Governor, La., at 4 (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/GAO/2016mar30_louisianapublicdef_l.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2S
V-NQLN] (“This is a critical time for Louisiana with respect to public defense. . . . The ABA asks
that you do everything in your power to ensure that Louisiana public defense is properly funded
so that attorneys may meet their constitutional and ethical obligations.”).
212. Derwyn Bunton, Opinion, When the Public Defender Says, ‘I Can’t Help,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-says-icant-help.html [https://perma.cc/2G7B-MKM5].
213. Greg LaRose, New Orleans City Council Approves 2017 Budget, with
More and Less for Criminal Justice, NOLA.COM (Nov. 17, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.nola.
com/politics/index.ssf/2016/11/new_orleans_city_council_appro_18.html [https://perma.cc/FX8SKNUM]; 2017 Proposed Operating Budget, http://nolacitycouncil.com/docs/resources/2017Proposed-Operating-Budget-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/T22Y-ZU8J].
214. 2016 La. Sess. Law Serv. 571 (West); Julia O’Donoghue, Lawmakers Look to Shift
Money to Public Defenders—from Death Penalty Appeals, NOLA.COM (Apr. 7, 2016, 6:35 PM),
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capital defense programs in the state.215 The OPD chief defender spoke
out against the bill,216 and the Louisiana District Attorney’s
Association supported it.217 Although the bill has some serious defects
(for example, reshuffling funds away from one class of criminal
defendants to another), it shows a willingness by the legislature to
respond to the indigent defense crisis in the state.
The OPD case study shows that public defenders can play a
powerful institutional role in spurring legislative reform. The
unreliable funding system created a budget shortfall, which caused
public defenders’ caseloads to rise beyond already unmanageable
levels. In response, the OPD has refused cases to maintain ethically
manageable workloads. These actions have left hundreds of people
accused of serious crimes without representation. A public safety crisis
resulted when a court released some of these unrepresented
defendants. And the crisis has garnered national attention. Thus, by
refusing new cases, the OPD has caused governance problems that
keep the spotlight on public defense and put political pressure on
legislators.
In addition to the forcing legislatures to respond, refusing new
cases aligns with the ABA’s recommendations218 and public defenders’
ethical obligations.219 Rather than engaging in “triage” and working in
a “processing system” for pleas, refusing to take new cases allows
public defenders to maintain constitutionally permissible caseloads.
Had the OPD continued to take new cases, criminal defendants
would have continued to receive inadequate representation. By
operating under unmanageable caseloads, the public defenders would
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/lawmakers_look_to_give_more_mo.html [https://
perma.cc/2ENX-Q2SQ].
215. See O’Donoghue, supra note 214 (noting that House Bill 1137 diverts funds from “capital
defense to local public defender offices”).
216. See Louisiana House of Representatives, Administration of Criminal Justice—Hearing
on HB 818 (La. Apr. 7, 2016), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer.aspx?
v=house/2016/apr/0407_16_CJ [https://perma.cc/7W9K-FZLX] (testimony beginning at minute
sixty-nine).
217. Karen Kidd, DA Association Backs Bill Aimed at Troubled Louisiana Public
Defender Board, LA. REC. (Apr. 30, 2016, 12:11 PM), http://louisianarecord.com/stories/
510720184-da-association-backs-bill-aimed-at-troubled-louisiana-public-defender-board [https://
perma.cc/F3B4-PT47].
218. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53, at 4 (“If a lawyer believes that her workload is such
that she is unable to meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in the representation of a
client, she must not continue the representation of that client . . . .”).
219. For further discussion of the ethical problems associated with excessive caseloads, see
supra Part II.
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have perpetuated an unjust and unconstitutional system. Instead,
cognizant of budget constraints, they took actions to maintain their
ethical obligations and their clients’ right to the effective assistance of
counsel.
Of course, refusing cases is not the perfect solution to the funding
crisis.220 The Louisiana legislature still has not adequately funded
public defense in the state, and criminal defendants in New Orleans
remain on waiting lists for representation. This approach only creates
pressure; it provides no immediate institutional reform. But it is a
starting point. When criminal defendants are unrepresented both in a
literal and political sense,221 public defenders can and should play a role
in the political process by refusing to take new cases.
CONCLUSION
The right to counsel is a fundamental tenet of the criminal-justice
system. Yet that right is regularly denied to indigent criminal
defendants who happen to be arrested in states that choose not to
adequately fund public defense. Absent a crisis, indigent defense is not
a top priority for state legislatures, and separation-of-powers and
federalism concerns have prevented courts from forcing legislatures to
take action. As the OPD case study shows, public defenders are in a
unique position to put pressure on legislatures. By refusing to take new
cases beyond ethical workloads, they can both maintain their
obligations to the profession and ensure constitutional representation
for their clients.

220. See Steiker, supra note 44, at 2701 (“There is clearly no silver bullet here; rather the
answer . . . involves the long, slow, and concerted effort of all possible institutional actors.”).
221. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1975 (“A criminal justice
system under the thumb of voters and politicians is a system prone to act on majoritarian
prejudices.”).

